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Abstract. IPv6 is the new communication protocol which will eventually
replace IPv4 is suffering from different security issues. As an initial step to
understand IPv6 networks and their vulnerabilities it is of critical importance to
identify the characteristics of the connected devices. Detecting the OS finger-
prints of these devices is one of these characteristics that are essential to iden-
tifying the vulnerabilities of each of them. Currently, few OS detection methods
have supported IPv6 protocol, as it did not fully replace IPv4 yet. This paper
attempts to describe the existing methods of OS fingerprinting with IPv6, as well
as their challenges and limitations. Moreover, this paper studies the available
datasets that might be used for IPv6 OS fingerprinting. By understanding the
existing methods and datasets, the reader can figure out the current needs for
proposing new OS fingerprinting methods for IPv6 protocol.
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1 Introduction
IPv6 has been designed to replace IPv4 after IPv4 was criticized in terms of the
addresses pool exhaustion and security issues. IPv6 has a four times longer header than
IPv4, which can provide an address to every single device in the world. The world’s
devices count is expected to be 40.9 billion in 2020 [1]. The number of the IPv6 users
is continuously increasing on a daily basis. An example of this is presented in Fig. 1
that illustrates the number of Google users who are currently using the IPv6 protocol.
IPv6 has built-in security mechanisms such as IPSec protocol which serves to over-
come some of IPv4 security issues. In addition, IPv6 introduced address auto config-
uration and mobility features for the nodes. Another main change in IPv6 compared to
IPv4 is its major dependency on the ICMPv6 protocol, where it was optional in IPv4.
These changes made the applicability of using IPv4 systems on IPv6 impossible [2].
Despite the security improvements of IPv6 over IPv4, it is still suffering from a set
of attacks that exposes its reliability. Recently, several studies showed that IPv6 is
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vulnerable to several types of attacks, which prevented it from being worthy to
implement in real networks. IPv6 attacks are categized into two classes, which are
either inherited from IPv4 protocol (performed in the same way of IPv4 attacks), or
new attacks that depend on the new features of IPv6 [3]. Moreover, some of the IPv6
new features such as the multicast address contribute to making IPv6 attacks easy to
perform. An example of this is Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
Identifying the OS fingerprint is a technique that collects information from a net-
work to determine the number of different hosts connected and the used OSes in the
network. Determining the used OSes in the network helps the administrator to realize
the security level of the network and find out potential vulnerabilities that the nodes are
exposed to. Moreover, the OS fingerprinting detection provides the administrator with
information about the unpatched or unauthorized and rogue devices that are attached to
the network [4]. As IPv6 networks are vulnerable to many attacks, discovering the used
OSes in the networks is a helpful step to improve its security and privacy.
This paper presents a review of the existing methods that are able to identify the
fingerprints of the OSes based on IPv6 traffic, as well as studying the available IPv6
datasets for such use. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper that
studied these methods in the light of IPv6 protocol. This paper aims to help in securing
IPv6 by presenting this summarized review to the interesting readers for a faster
understanding of the OS fingerprinting area. Moreover, having such review opens
several questions about the existing methods and their worthiness to be applied to a real
network.
OS fingerprinting methods are categorized based on the used technique of col-
lecting the information into two main categories, which are active technique and
passive technique. Active techniques depend on sending craft packets to the OSes and
identify them based on their responses. Passive techniques prefer to be silent and
depend on the normally generated traffics from the OSes. Passive techniques have the
Fig. 1. Google IPv6 users
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advantage over the active techniques that they do not affect the network performance as
they do not generate any traffic (overhead) on the network. In addition, active tech-
niques are never able to determine OSes that are located behind a firewall that crafted
packets are unable to reach [5].
This paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 details some of the existing OS fin-
gerprinting methods and highlights some interesting point of their strength and
weakness. Section 3 describes the availability of IPv6 datasets for OS fingerprinting
purposes. Section 4 concludes the paper findings with opportunity for future promising
technique.
2 IPv6 OS Fingerprinting Methods
IPv4 has been sufficiently studied in the light of OS fingerprinting, and several tools
have been proposed for that purpose such as ETTERCAP [6] and Xprobe [7]. IPv4
addresses exhaustion problem is not the only addressed problem by IPv6. Many other
features have been either improved, changed or added in the new protocol. Therefore,
IPv4 OS fingerprinting methods are unsuitable to be directly applied to IPv6 networks,
due to the major changes between the two protocols. However, some researchers have
tried to adapt these methods to support IPv6 protocol by considering its new features
and fields.
Security researchers realized that IPv6 needs more improvements to reach the goal
of securing its networks. Therefore, several OS fingerprinting methods have supported
IPv6 protocol as a step towards that goal. These methods are either IPv4 tools that were
adapted to support IPv6 protocol by making use of its characteristics, or newly pro-
posed IPv6 OS fingerprinting methods. All these methods are classified based on their
information source into active or passive techniques. Figure 2 shows the taxonomy of
the existing IPv6 OS fingerprinting methods.
Fig. 2. Taxonomy of IPv6 OS fingerprinting existing methods
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2.1 Active Techniques
Active fingerprinting is an aggressive method that probes the targeted devices by
sending crafted packets to response with certain messages. The advantages of using
such techniques is that they allow their systems to be located at any point of the
network, as well as that system can learn more about the network compared to passive
techniques. However, active techniques add overhead to the network because of the
sent probe packets to the nodes. Moreover, IDSs might identify these packets as
malicious behavior that leads to blocking or dropping them.
Several active OS fingerprinting methods have been adapted from IPv4 existing
methods or exclusively proposed to identify OSes based on IPv6 traffic.
NMAP [8] is one of the most common free and open source tools that help in
exploring and securing networks. It was released in 1998 to provide different services,
including port scanning and active OS fingerprinting detection. NMAP uses raw IP
packets in novel ways to determine the OSes. NMAP improved its OS detection
accuracy compared to other tools by increasing the number of tests (probe packets) that
are sent toward the targeted device (currently, 18 packets (TCP, UDP, ICMP) are sent).
The devices’ responses to the probe packets are compared to the NMAP database of
OSes signatures and the closest match is chosen. IPv6 is started to be supported by
NMAP since 2011.
The multiple tests that are used in NMAP have improved its detection ability to
determine diverse types of OSes. However, these tests exposed the NMAP to be
detected as an intrusion by IDS systems due to their suspicious behavior [9]. Moreover,
the sent packet might lead to slowing down the performance and affecting the avail-
ability of the network. Despite, NMAP understands IPv6 traffic, and its IPv6 database
is still considered small, and is unable to automatically determine the OSes based on
IPv6 traffic [4, 10]. Although, NMAP has three scanning techniques for IPv6 protocol,
practically, TCP scanning is the only working scan [10].
sinFP [11] was released by Patrice Auffret in 2006 mainly to overcome the
problems of NMAP tool. sinFP has the ability to use both active and passive finger-
printing techniques using a real SQLite database. In addition to IPv6 support, sinFP has
the features of using a few probe packets (3 packets), apply the heuristic matching
algorithm, and works in online and offline modes. Another advantage of sinFP is the
ability to share the database to be utilized and integrated into other systems.
SinFP supported IPv6 by replacing its equivalent fields to IPv4 such as Identifi-
cation (ID), Time to Live (TTL), and Don’t Fragment (DF) with Flow Label, Hop
Limit, and Traffic Class respectively. sinFP is one of the OSes detection tools that
support IPv6 OS fingerprinting with its first versions. As SinFP depends on a database
of signatures, it suffers from inaccurate detection of OSes that are not pre-recorded in
the databases, or when the databases are not up-to-date. Also, sinFP has been criticized
for the OS detection being inaccurate, as well as for the potential that the probe packets
could be categorized as attacks by IDSs [12]. Therefore, it could not be considered as a
reliable tool, and further improvements are still required.
Beck et al. [12] have proposed active OS detection methods exclusively for IPv6
traffics after they concluded that passive techniques are infeasible on IPv6. A simple
tool namely osfinger6 has been developed using Python language and Scapy6 packet
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manipulation tool [13] to generate the required tests (probe packets). The authors
conducted an experiment of sending 156 forged NS messages on a small testbed (6
OSes) using the osfinger6 tool. Based on the observations of the OSes responses,
decision tree of the available OSes has been built.
The authors have figured out some surprising results about the OSes’ responses to
the sent NDP probe packets. However, applying such methods in real networks is
irrational due to the same problem of NAMP tool of using a vast number of probe
packets. These packets contribute in consuming the networks bandwidth and the
possibility of classifying the tool as an intrusion by IDSs. Moreover, the proposed
technique has not included the recent changes to the IPv6 extension headers that are
defined in RFC 7045 and RFC 6564 [14]. To include the routers to the detected
fingerprints, the authors promised to use NS and RS messages.
2.2 Passive Techniques
Passive fingerprinting techniques depend on analyzing the target devices traffics
without calling them by sending probe packets. Passive techniques are preferred as the
targeted devices are never bothered, thus, the network performance will not be affected.
Also, the OS detection tool will be allowed to work normally by the IDSs. The
disadvantages of passive techniques are that they could take a long waiting time to get
the needed packets from the network to identify the OSes [15]. Moreover, passive
techniques cannot work remotely as the tool must be located inside the targeted net-
work to be able to capture the traffic [16].
Despite the advantages of passive OS fingerprinting, it has been applied for IPv6
traffic in one method which is p0f.
P0f (Passive OS Fingerprinting) [17] is the first effective passive OS detection
tool. It is one of the most popular passive OS fingerprinting tools and was proposed by
Zalewski in 2000. It depends on analyzing the TCP header to extract 9 features
(mentioned in [18]) and compare them to a database of signatures to determine the
OSes. It also has the ability to detect the OS version, firewall, Network Address
Translation (NAT), and the distance to the remote system [12]. P0f does not have user
graphical interface, it only can be used through command line prompt.
P0f has the advantage, compared to the active techniques, that it can detect the
OSes that are located behind the firewall or NAT. However, the accuracy of identifying
the OSes has been criticized as being inaccurate compared to active techniques [10]. In
addition, P0f does not work for encrypted traffics where the TCP fields cannot be read.
For IPv6 packets, p0f applies the same fingerprints of IPv4 with replacing its fields with
their IPv4 equivalents [19]. Despite p0f understanding IPv6 traffic, it does not accu-
rately detect OSes based on it traffics [12].
On summary, few OS fingerprinting methods have been proposed or adapted for
IPv6 traffic.
As concluded from Table 1, insufficient research has been conducted on IPv6 OS
fingerprinting. This could be due to the lake of implementation of IPv6 protocol on
today’s networks where most of the OSes still working with IPv4. The existing OS
fingerprinting methods were either originally proposed for IPv6, or produced for IPv4
and then adapted to support IPv6. Both have several disadvantages that exposed their
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accuracy or affected network performance. Therefore, more work needs to be done to
improve the existing methods and overcome their limitations and disadvantages.
The traditional categorization of OS fingerprinting methods has been used in IPv6
fingerprinting methods. The used techniques have been classified into active and
passive techniques. Active techniques have two main problems. One is being exposed
to being blocked as an attacker, and the other one is their negative effects on the
network. Passive techniques work silently to avoid these problems, and therefore they
might be promising to be more applicable in IPv6 OS detection. Despite, the strengths
of passive techniques they have been used in one IPv6 fingerprinting tool (p0f) only.
3 Datasets
Several OS fingerprinting methods depend on datasets of traffic to be used for design
and evaluation of any new methods. Different IPv4 datasets have been used for this
purpose such IRL dataset [20]. On the OS fingerprinting area, these datasets have
different purpose which are;
Table 1. Summarizes the proposed IPv6 OS detection methods.
Method Description Disadvantages
NMAP • Active OS fingerprinting
• 18 probe packets
• Understand IPv6 since
2011
• Might be detected as attacker
• Might affect the network availability
• Small database for IPv6 traffic
• Unable to detect IPv6 OSes automatically
sinFP • Active and passive OS
fingerprinting




• Might be detected as attacker
• Might affect the network availability
• Inaccurate OS detection
Beck et al.
(osfinger6)
• Active OS fingerprinting
• 156 probe packets (forged
NS)
• Support only IPv6
• OSes decision tree was
built
• Might be detected as attacker
• The probe packets might affect the network
availability
• Does not include the recent changes to IPv6
extension headers
P0f • Passive OS fingerprinting
• Understand IPv6
• Depends on analyzing 9
TCP features
• Detect behind firewall and
NAT OSes
• Inaccurate OS detection
• Does not work for encrypted traffics
• Unable to detect IPv6 OSes automatically
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• Understanding the traffic to propose better OS detection methods.
• Choosing the most related features (fingerprints).
• Training different classifiers to discover the most optimal one.
• Evaluating the efficiency of any new proposed method.
• Comparing two different methods by applying them to the same dataset.
In order to propose more IPv6 OS fingerprinting methods, there is an initial need to
have a reference dataset with comprehensive OSes. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is a lack of availability of IPv6 datasets for such usage. This could be
due to the privacy issues of the IPv6 information (such as IPv6 address and prefix) that
might be included in the traffic which might expose the network to outside attacks.
However, encryption or mapping techniques can solve such problem. Matoušek et al.
[14] is the only research that has noticed this problem and promised to create an IPv6
dataset for OS fingerprinting purpose.
4 Conclusion
Sine IPv6 OS fingerprinting is not widely supported by the security community, this
paper opens the door to motivate others to study it. By exploring the existing finger-
printing methods that have the ability to understand and identify OSes based on IPv6
traffic, different points of interest have been highlighted. First, a small number of these
methods support IPv6 which either were proposed for IPv6 or adapted from IPv4.
Second, these methods are limited by several issues that need to be addressed before
their employment on real networks. Third, the lake of the IPv6 datasets is another
reason for this shortage of the IPv6 OS fingerprinting methods. Lastly, passive tech-
niques seem more promising to be used in IPv6 OS detection compared to the active
techniques due to their silent style, which saves their tools, as well as network
resources.
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